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I.  Introduction 
Today, many companies are operating world wide or are concluding strategic alliances to have 
a greater.presence in foreign markets through an international partner. The economic effects of 
mergers, restrictive practices or abuses of dominant positions are often felt in countries other 
than those in which the firms concerned are incorporated or based. 
Extraterritorial Applicatuon of Competition Rules 
One way for  competition authorities to deal  with restrictive practices with an  international 
.  dimension  is  the  use  of extraterritorial  jurisdiction.  Many  jurisdictions,  including  the 
European  Community,  seek to apply their competition rules under certain circumstances to 
behaviour taking place in a foreign country which may harm their markets. 
The United States has expanded its extraterritorial jurisdiction more than any other country. In 
particular,  the  US  claims jurisdiction to apply  its competition laws to behaviour occurring 
outside its territory in  order to address market access problems experienced by US  exports, 
regardless of whether or riot  US  consumers  ate harmed  by  the  activity  in  question.  TJlls 
expansion of jurisdiction has  caused  political fiictions  in  EC/US bilateral relations where it 
concerns behaviour occurring in the European Community. 
Not only  does the extraterritorial application of laws create political  frictions  but  practical 
problems are  also  encountered  due to a  lack  of personal jurisdiction  and  the  difficulty  of 
obtaining evidence located abroad. 
The extraterritorial application of laws is not the only means competition authorities have to 
ensure that anticompetitive behaviour occurring outside its territory is brought to an end. It is 
becoming  increasingly  obvious  that,  in order to regulate  the  anticompetitive  behaviour  of 
companies  operating  on  the  world  wide  market,  efficiently  and  effectively,  competition 
authorities need to cooperate with each other. Cooperation between competition enforcement 
agencies can also ensure that companies are not made the subject of  conflicting decisions. 
The  Commission  and  the Government of the United  States of America recognized  this  on 
23 September  1991  when they entered into  an  agreement  regarding the application of their 
competition laws  (the .. 1991  Agreement")
1
. The  1991 Agreement facilitates cooperation between 
the Parties competition authorities and the coordination of  their enforcement activities.  As well as 
Following  a  decision  by  the  European  Court  of Justice,  this  Agreement  and  the  exchange  of 
interpretative letters dated May 31  and July 31,  1995  were subsequently approved on behalf of the 
European Community and the European Coal and Steel Community by a joint decision of  the Council and 
the Commission of 10 April1995 (OJ No L 95, 27.4.1995, pp. 45-50). 
2 facilitating  coordination,  the  1991  Agreement  requires  a  Party  to  take  into  account  the 
important interests of  the other Party at all stages of  its enforcement activities ("traditional" or 
"negative" comity). 
FositBve Collllllity 
The 1991  Agreement introduces the concept of  positive comity in EC/US relations.  Article V 
provides  that  a  Party  adversely  affected  by  anticompetitive  behaviour  carried  out  in  the 
territory of  the other Party may request that other Party to take enforcement action. 
It is clearly preferable, from the European Community's point ofview, that the United States 
avail  of the principle of positive  comity when considering anticompetitive behaviour taking 
place  within  the European Community rather than  seeking  to apply  US  competition laws. 
Through  positive  comity  the  Commission  can  retain  control,  where  it  so  wishes,  of 
enforcement procedures addressing such behaviour.  Positive comity also has advantages for 
companies  as  it  helps  to  reduce  the  number  of cases  being  examined  by  more  than  one 
competition  authority,  thus  reducing  compliance  costs  and  the  possibility  of conflicting 
decisions being made by different competition authorities. 
In  addition,  there are potential  benefits for  the· European Community if it  can  request the 
US competition  authorities  to  investigate  and  bring  to  an  end  anticompetitive  activities 
occurring  in  the  territory  of the  United  States  but  adversely  affecting  interests  of the 
Europe Community.  Positive Comity can enable problems encountered in the extraterritorial 
application  of jurisdiction,  such  as  difficulties  in  obtaining  evidence  located  abroad  to  be 
overcome. 
II.  The Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the 
U  outed States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the 
Enforcement of  their Competition Laws 
Before the European Community can enter into deeper cooperation with the US it is necessary 
to address the wide jurisdictional claims made by the US in the application of  its antitrust laws. 
It  was  recognized  that  positive  comity  provides  a  method  of addressing  anticompetitive 
behaviour,  occurring outside a country's territory,  without giving  rise to the need  to exert 
extraterritorial jurisdiction 
Accordingly, on 25 October 1996 the Commission was granted a mandate by the Council to enter 
into negotiations with the United States to seek to reach an agreement which would strengthen the 
positive comity provisions ofthe 1991 Agreement. 
The  Commission  has  negotiated  a  Draft  Agreemeni  with  the  American  authorities.  The 
Draft Agreement  applies  where certain  anticompetitive activities  are occurring  in  whole or in  a 
substantial part in the territory of  on~ Party and yet at the same time also have adverse effects on 
the interests of the other Party.  In such cases,  the latter Party,  may request the Party in whose 
territory  the  conduct  is  principally  occurring  to  take  enforcement  action  pursuant  to  its  own 
competition rules. 
2  Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of  ~erica 
on the application of  positive comity principles in the enforcement of  their competition laws. 
3 The. Draft Agreement is  an important step forward from  Article  V of the 1991  as  it  not only 
provides guidelines on how positive comity requests should be dealt with, it raises a presumption· 
that in certain circumstances a Party will normally defer or suspend its own enforcement activities. 
The presumption of  deferral or suspension arises where the antioompetitive activities at issue do not 
have a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable impact on the Requesting Party's consumers, 
or where the anti  competitive activities occur principally in and are directed' principally towards the 
other Party's territory.  In other words the presumption· arises  where the Requesting Party is 
seeking to protect its export trade or where the centre of  gravity of  the anti competitive activities is 
within the territory of  the other Party. 
There are a number of  other conditions which also must be satisfied in order for the presumption of 
deferral or suspension to arise, including, a willingness on the part of  the Requested Party to deal 
with the matter, to keep the Requesting Party informed of  all developments and to take the latters 
concerns on board prior to the conclusion of  the investigation.  The Requested Party can only act 
on the basis of  its own competition rules and to the extent that the relevant behaviour is caught by 
those rules. 
While  the Requested Party must agree to a  m1fnber  of conditions  in  order to give rise  to the 
presumption of  a suspension or deferral, it is not obliged to do so.  There is therefore no risk that a 
Requested Party would be obliged to investigate a case where it was not within its interests to do 
so.  However,  very  often  it  will  be  in  the  Requested  Party's  interest  to  bring  an  end  to 
anticompetitive behaviour occurring on its territory and it may be extremely beneficial to have such 
behaviour brought to its attention. 
The Draft Agreement recognizes that there may be circumstances where it is appropriate for both 
Parties to undertake parallel  investigations,  for example when the public  interest  requires that 
particularly  serious  anticompetitive  activity  is  subject  to  sanction  in  both jurisdictions.  This 
recognition  of the  possible  appropriateness  of parallel  investigations  only  applies  where  both 
markets are harmed and would not apply where one Party was seeking to protect its export trade. 
Mergers  are  not  within  the  scope of the  Draft  Agreement  due  to  US  and  EC  merger 
legislation,  which  would  not  allow a  deferral  or suspension of action as  envisaged by the 
Draft Agreement, due to the obligation to adopt a final decision within tight time limits. 
The  Explanatory  Memorandum  set  out  in  Annex  1  gives  a  detailed  description  of the 
provisions of  the Draft Agreement. 
m.  Legal Basi§ 
In so far as the Draft Agreement relates to the competition rules of  the EC Treaty, the legal 
basis forthe Council to conclude the Agreement is Article 87 of  the EC Treaty in conjunction 
with the first subparagraph of  Article 228 paragraph 3 thereof  The European Parliament must 
be  consulted  before  the  Council  can  conclude  the  Agreement.  To  the  extent  that  the 
Agreement applies to ECSC products, Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty form the legal 
basis for the Commission.to conclude the Draft Agreement. 
In contrast to the 1991  Agreement,  Article 23 5  of the EC TreatY does not apply as cases 
falling under the Merger Regulation are not within the scope of  the Draft Agreement. 
4 IV.  Condushm 
The Commission believes that the Draft Agreement is  an  important development in  relations 
with the US and represents a political commitment on the part of  the U§ to cooperate with the 
Commission rather than seeking to apply its antitrust laws extraterritorially in the EU. 
The Draft Agreement if  entered into will formally institutionalize the political commitment that 
the  US  will  normally  refrain  from  addressing  anticompetitive  behaviou~ which  does  not 
affect US  consumers,  or  is  directed  principally  in  and  directed  principally  towards  the 
European Community, where the Commission is prepared to deal with the matter. 
Due  to  the  advantages  of  positive  comity  described  above,  and  the  reinforcement 
thereof resulting  from  the  important  presumptions  created  by  the  Draft  Agreement,  the 
Commission  proposes  that  the · Council  jointly  with  the  Commission  adopt  a  decision  to 
conclude the attached Draft  Agreement.  To this  end,  a  proposal  for  a joint  Council  and 
Commission Decision concluding the Agreement between the European Communities and the 
Government of  the United States of  America on the application of  positive comity principles in 
the enforcement of  their competition laws is set out in Annex 2. 
5 ANNEXl 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
The  Agreement  between  the  European  Communities  and  the  Government  of the 
United States  of America  on  the  Application  of Positive  Comity  Principles  in  the 
.  Enforcement of their Competition Laws 
Description of the Agreement 
Objective 
The main objective of  the Draft Agreement is to encourage the use of  positive comity principles 
and to specifY the circumstances in which positive comity should be invoked and how requests for 
positive comity should be deaft with .. 
Article I-Scope and Purpose 
Article I.  I  of the Draft Agreement  sets out the circumstances in which the agreement wilJ 
apply.  Namely, where anticompetitive activities are occurring in whole or in substantial part in 
the territory of one Party but are adversely  affecting the  inter~sts of the other Party.  The 
activities in question must be impermissible under the .competition laws of  the Party in whose 
territory the activities are occurring. 
Article 1.2 sets out that the purpose of  the Draft Agreement is to remove impediments to trade 
and investment· flows  and to  establish through cooperation the most effective  and  efficient 
method for the enforcement of  competition laws.  · 
Article II- Definitions 
The definitions used in Article II are the same as those used in the 1991  Agreement, with the 
important exception of  the definition of  competition laws.  Here, on both the EC and US sides, 
mergers have been specifically excluded due to US and EC merger legislation, which would 
not allow a  deferral or suspension of action as envisaged by the Draft Agreement, due to the 
obligation to adopt a final  decision within tight time limits.  Like the 1991  Agreement,  it  is 
necessary  to  provide  for  an  extension of the  definition  of competition  laws  to take  into 
account the possibility that further laws or implementing regulations may be adopted in  the 
future.  The need for both parties to consent in writing to any extension of the definition of 
competition laws ensures that there is  no danger of  the definition being extended beyond its 
intended scope. 
Three  new  definitions  also  appear;  "Adverse  effects"  and  "Adversely  affected", 
"Requesting Party" and "Requested Party". 
6 Article Ill  - Positive Comity 
Article Ill sets out the principle  of positive  comity.  Article  Ill provides that where  a Party 
believes that anticompetitive activities,  occurring in the territory of  the other Party, are adversely 
affecting its interests, it may request the other Party's competition authority to initiate appropriate 
enforcement  activities.  This  possibility  applies  even  if the  first  Party  has  commenced  or 
contemplates taking enforcement action itself 
Article IV- Deferral or Suspension of  Enforcement Activities 
Article  IV. I  provides  that  the  parties  may  agree  that  the  Requesting  Party  will  defer  or 
suspend enforcement activities while the Requested Party is investigating the activities. 
Article  IV.2  sets  out  in  the  detail  the  conditions  which,  if satisfied,  will  give  rise  to  a 
presumption that the Requesting Party will defer or suspend its enforcement activities. 
Article IV.2.  (a) (i) is  noteworthy as it  contains a presumption of deferral or suspen~ion of 
enforcement  activities  where  the  anticompetitive  activities  do  not  have  an  impact  on the 
Requesting Party's consumers. This means that the presumption of  deferral or suspension shall 
apply where the anticompetitive behaviour affects only exports. 
There is  also a presumption of deferral or suspension in Article IV.2 (a) (ii) if the centre of 
gravity of the anticompetitive activities is in the territory of the other Party.  The centre of 
gravity of  an activity is defined in the Draft Agreement as the territory in which the actiVities 
"occur principally in and are directed principally towards". 
Article IV.2.  (b) states that the presumption of deferral or suspension shall only apply if  the 
adverse effects on the Requesting Party are likely to be fully and adequately investigated and 
remedied by the Requested Party. The Parties recognize that there may be circumstances where 
it is appropriate for both Parties to undertake parallel investigations.  This may be the case where 
due to the particularly serious nature of  the anticompetitive activity public interest requires that it is 
subject to sanction in both jurisdictions. This recognition of  the possible appropriateness of  parallel 
investigations only applies where the markets of  both Parties are harmed. 
Article IV.2 (c) sets out a number of  requirements which the Requested Party must agree to in 
order for the presumption of deferral or suspension to arise.  It is  necessary to set out these 
commitments in  order for the Requesting Party to have the confidence to defer or suspend 
action. The Requested Party must agree that it will use its best efforts and adequate resources 
to investigate the activity and that it will keep the Requesting Party informed of the status of 
their  enforcement  activities  and  of their  intentions.  The  Requested  Party  must  agree  to 
complete their investigation within  six  months of the deferral  or suspension or within such 
time as agreed to by the competition authorities. The Requested Party must also agree to take 
into account the views of  the Requesting Party prior to any conclusion of  the investigation and 
to comply with any reasonable request made by the Requesting Party. 
Where it is appropriate to provide confidential information to the Requesting Pai-ty in order to 
keep  that  Party  informed  of any  action  being  taken,  the  consent  of the  source  of that 
information  must  be  obtained.  Community  law  provides  a  high  level  of protection  to 
confidential information provided to the Commission, and it will l;>e necessary that any consent 
obtained  is  sufficient  to discharge the Commission  from  its obligation of confidentiality as 
7 provided by  general  principles  of Community  Law,  the  case  law  of the  European  Court 
ofJustice and  Article 20(2) of Regulation No.  17.  Like the rest of the Draft Agreement,  this 
Article  must  be  read  in  conjunction  with  Article  VII,  which  states  that  existing  laws  remain  ' 
unchanged. 
If the Requesting Party chooses not to defer or suspend its enforcement activities, where the 
conditions of  Article IV.2 are satisfied, it must inform the Requested Party of its reasons. This 
duty to give reasons will allow such situations to be closely monitored and explained. 
Article  IV.3  simply  states  that  a Requesting  Party may  choose  to defer  or suspend  their 
enforcement activities even if some of  the conditions set out in Article IV.2 are not satisfied. 
Article IV.  4 recognizes that a Party that has deferred  or suspended action may later initiate or 
reinstitute enforcement activities.  In such circumstances that Party must inform the other Party of 
its intentions and reasons. This duty to provide reasons will impose a control over such cases and a 
method for understanding why cooperation has failed to meet the expectations of the Requesting 
Party.  Where both Parties take enforcement action they shall, where appropriate, cooperate under 
the 1991 Agreement. 
Article V- Confidentiality and Use of  Information 
Article V of the Draft Agreement makes it clear that information provided under the Agreement 
may only be used for the implementation of the Agreement unless the competition authority that 
provided the information has consented to another use.  A further safeguard is provided to those 
who have consented to certain confidential information being disclosed,  in that  such information 
may  not  be used for  any  other purpose unless  the competition authority and  the  source of the 
·information consent. 
The  confidentiality  of all  information  provided  .under  the  Draft  Agreement  is  protected  by 
Article VIII of  the 1991 Agreement and the exchange of  letters dated May 31 and July 31, 1995
3
. 
Article "VI- Relationship to the 1991 Agreement 
Article  VI firmly  ties  the  1991  Agreement to the Draft  Agreement  and  makes  it  clear that the 
Draft Agreement supplements the 1991  Agreement by developing the concept of positive comity. 
The Draft Agreement must be interpreted consistently with the 1991 Agreement. 
Article "VII- Existing Law 
Article· VII states that the existing laws of  the US and the EC remain unchanged by the Agreement 
and that the Agreement must be interpreted consistently with those existing laws. It is important to 
note that the Agreement cannot permit either of  the Parties' competition authorities to do any act 
that they do not already have the power to do. 
Article "VIII- Entry into Force and Termination 
Article VIII states that the Agreement will enter into force upon signature. The Agreement may be 
terminated by either Party upon giving 60 days notice of  that intention. 
See footnote 1 
8 ANNEX2 
Proposal for a 
DECISION OF THE" COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION 
concerning the conclusion of  the Agreement between the European Communities 
and the Government of  the United States of  America regarding the application of 
positive comity principles in the enforcement of  their competition laws 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 87 
in conjunction with the first subparagraph of  Article 228(3) thereof, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Coal  and  Steel  Community,  and  in 
particular Articles 65 and 66 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission
4
; 
Having regard to the opinion of  the European Parliament
5
, 
Whereas  the  Agreement  of 23  September  1991  between  the  European  Communities  and 
the  Government  of the  United  States  of  America  regarding  the  application  of their 
competition laws,  and  the exchange of interpretative letters dated 31  May and  31  July  1995 
in  relation  to  that  Agreement  (together  hereinafter  "the  1991  Agreement"},  attached  to 
Decision  95/145/EC,  ECSC  of the  Council  and  the  Commission  has  contributed  to 
. coordination, cooperation and avoidance of  conflicts in competition law enforcement
6
; 
Whereas Article V of the  1991  Agreement,  commonly referred to as  the  "Positive Comity" 
article,  calls for cooperation regarding anticompetitive activities occurring in  the territory of 
one Party that adversely affect the interests of  the other Party; 
Whereas further elaboration of  the principles of  positive comity and of  the implementation of 
those  principles  would  enhance  the  1991  Agreement's  effectiveness  in  relation  to  such 
conduct; 
Whereas, to this end,  the Commission has negotiated an Agreement with the Government of 
the  United  States  of America  on  the  application  of positive  comity  principles  in  the 
enforcement of the competition rules of  the European Communities and of the United States 
of  America;  · 
Whereas the Agreement should be approved, 
4 
5 
6  OJNoL 95, 27.4.1995, p. 45; corrigendum inOJNoL 131, 15.6.1995, p. 38. 
9 HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION: 
Article I 
The  Agreement  between  and  the  European  Communities  and  the  Government  of the 
United  States  of America  regarding  the  application  of positive  comity  principles  in  the 
enforcement  of  their  competition  laws  is  hereby  approved  on  behalf  of  the 
European Community and the European Coal and Steel Community. 
The text of the Agreement, drawn up in the Spanish, Danish, German, Greek, English, French, 
Italian, Dutch, Portuguese, Finnish and Swedish languages, is attached to this Decision. 
Article 2 
The President of the Council is  hereby authorized to designate the person(  s)  empowered to 
sign the Agre~ment on behalf of  the European Community. 
The President of  the Commission is hereby authorized to designate the person(  s) empowered 
to sign the Agreement on behalf of  the European Coal and Steel Community. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the Council 
The President 
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For the Commission 
The President AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN <OOlMMliJNITJrES AND 
TJHTE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATE§ OF AMEIDCA 
ON TIIflE APPLICATION OF POSITIVJE COMJITI{ Pl!UNCIPLES 
IN THlE !ENFORCEMENT OF THEIR COMPJETITION JLA WS 
The European Community and  the European Coal  and  Steel  Commuriity  of the orte  part 
(hereinafter  "the  European  Communities"),  and  the  Government  of the  United  States  of 
America  of  the other part: 
Having regard to the September 23, 1991  Agreement between the European Communities and 
the  Government  of the  United  States  of America  Regarding  the  Application  of Their 
Competition Laws, and the exchange of  interpretative letters dated May 31  and July 31, 1995 
in relation to that Agreement (together hereinafter "the 1991  Agreement"); 
Recognizing  that  the  1991  Agreement  has  contributed  to  coordination,  cooperation,  and 
avoidance of  conflicts in competition law enforcement; 
Noting  in  particular  Article  V  of the  1991  Agreement,  commonly  referred  to  as  the 
"Positive Comity"  article,  which  calls  for  cooperation  regarding  anticompetitive  activities 
occurring in the territory of  one Party that adversely affect the interests of  the other Party; 
Believing  that  further  elaboration  of  the  principles  of  positive  comity  and  of  the 
implementation  of those  principles  would  enhance  the  1991  Agreement's  effectiveness  in 
relation to such conduct; and 
Noting that nothing in this  Agreem~nt or its implementation shall be construed as  prejudicing 
either Party's position on issues of  competition law jurisdiction in the international context; 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
Scope and Purpose of  this Agreement 
1.  This Agreement applies where a Party satisfies the other that there is reason to believe 
that the following circumstances are present: 
(a)  Anticompetitive activities are occurring in whole or in  substantial part in the 
territory of one of the Parties and  are adversely affecting the interests of the 
other Party; and 
(b)  The activities in question are impermissible under the competition laws of the 
Party in the territory of  which the activities are occurring. 
11 2.  The purposes of  this Agreement are to: 
. (a)  Help  ensure  th~t  trade  and  investment  flows  between  the  Parties  and 
competition and  consumer welfare within the territories· of the Parties are not 
impeded by anticompetitive activities for which the competition laws of one or 
both Parties can provide a remedy, and 
(b)  Establish  cooperative  procedures to achieve  the  most  effective  and  efficient 
enforcement of competition law,  whereby the competition authorities of each 
Party  will  normally  avoid  allocating  enforcement  resources  to  dealing  with 
anticompetitive activities that occur principally in  and  are  directed principally 
towards the other Party's territory,  where the competition authorities of the 
other Party are able and prepared to examine and take effective sanctions under 
their law to deal with those activities. 
As used in this Agreement: 
Article II 
Definitions 
1.  "Adverse  effects"  and  "adversely  affected"  mean  harm  caused  by  anticompetitive 
activities to: 
(a)  the  ability  of firms  in  the  territory  of a  Party  to  export  to,  invest  in,  or 
otherwise compete in the territory of  the other Party, or 
(b)  ~  competition in a Party's domestic or import markets. 
2.  "Requesting  Party"  means  a  Party  that  is  adversely  affected  by  anticompetitive 
activities occurring in whole or in substantial part in the territory of  the other Party. 
3.  "Requested  Party"  means  a  Party  in  the  territory  of which  such  anti competitive 
activities appear to be occurring. 
4.  "Competition law(s)" means 
(a)  for  the  European  Comrilunities,  Articles  85,  86,  and  89  of the  Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Community  (EC),  Articles  65  and  66(7)  of the 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and their 
implementing  instruments,  to  the  exclusion  of Council  Regulation  (EEC) 
No 4064/89 on the control of  concentrations between undertakings, and 
(b)  for  the  United  States of America,  the  Sherman Act  (15  U.S.C.  §§1-7),  the 
Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§12-27, except as it relates to investigations pursuant 
to Title  II  of the  Hart-Scott-Rodino  Antitrust  Improvements  Act  of 1976, 
15 U.S.C.  §18a), the Wilson  Tariff Act  (15  U.S.C.  §§8-11),  and  the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (15  U.S.C.  §§41-58, except as these sections relate to 
consumer protection functions), 
as well as such other laws or regulations as the Parties shall jointly agree in writing to 
be a "competition law'' for the pu~oses of  this Agreement. 
12 5.  "Competition authorities" means: 
(a)  for the European Communities, the Commission of  the European Communities, 
as  to  its  responsibilities  pursuant  to the  competition  laws  of the  European 
Communities, and 
(b)  for the United States, the Antitrust Division of  the United States Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. 
6.  "Enforcement  activities"  means  any  application  of competition  law  by  way  of 
investigation or proceeding conducted by the competition authorities of  a Party. 
7.  "Anticompetitive  activities"  means  any  conduct  or transaction that  is  impermissible 
under the competition laws of  a Party. 
Article III 
· Positive Comity 
The competition authorities of  a Requesting Party may request the competition authorities of  a 
Requested  Party  to investigate  and,  if warranted,  to  remedy  anticompetitive  activities  in 
accordance  with  the  Requested  Party's  competition  laws.  Such  a  request  may  be  made 
regardless of whether the activities also violate the Requesting Party's competition laws,  and 
regardless of  whether the competition authorities of  the Requesting Party have commenced or 
contemplate taking enforcement activities under their own competition laws. 
Article IV 
Deferral or Suspension of  Investigations in Reliance 
On Enforcement Activity by the Requested Party 
1.  The competition authorities of  the Parties may agree that the competition authorities of 
the  Requesting  Party  will  defer  or  suspend  pending  or contemplated  enforcement 
.activities during the pendency of  enforcement activities ofthe Requested Party. 
2.  The competition authorities of  a Requesting Party will normally defer or suspend their 
own  enforcement  activities  in  favor  of enforcement  activities  by  the  competition 
authorities of  the Requested Party when the following conditions are satisfied: 
13 (a)  The anticompetitive activities at issue: 
(i)  do not have a direct,  substantial and reasonably foreseeable impact on 
consumers in the Requesting Party's territory, or 
(ii)  where  the  anticompetitive  activities  do  have  such  an  impact  on the 
Requesting  Party's  consumers,  they  occur  principally  in  and  are 
directed principally towards the other Party's territory; 
(b)  The  adverse  effects  on the interests of the Requesting Party can be  and  are 
likely to be fully and adequately investigated and, as appropriate, eliminated or · 
adequately remedied pursuant to the laws,  procedures, and available remedies 
of the Requested Party.  The Parties recognize that it  may  be  appropriate to· 
pursue  separate  enforcement  activities  where  anticompetitive  activities 
affecting  both  territories  justify  the  imposition  of  penalties  within  both 
jurisdictions; 
(c)  The competition authorities of the Requested Party agree that in  conducting 
their own enforcement activities, they will: 
(i)  devote adequate resources to investigate the anticompetitive activities 
and,  where  appropriate,  promptly  pursue · adequate  enforcement 
activities; 
(ii)  use  their  best  efforts  to  pursue  all  reasonably  available  sources  of 
information, including such sources of  information as may be suggested 
by the competition authorities of  the Requestin~  Party; 
(iii)  inform the competition authorities of the Requesting Party,  on request 
or at reasonable intervals,  of the status of their enforcement activities 
and  intentions,  and  where  appropriate  provide  to  the  competition 
authorities of  the  Requesting Party relevant confidential information if 
consent  has  been  obtained  from  the  source  concerned.  The  use  and 
disclosure of  such information shall be governed by Article V; 
(iv)  promptly notify the competition authorities of the Requesting Party of 
any  change  in  their  intentions  with  respect  to  investigation  or 
enforcement; 
(v)  use  their best  efforts  to  complete their investigation  and  to obtain  a 
remedy or initiate proceedings within six months, or such other time as 
agreed to by the competition authorities of  the Parties, of  the deferral or 
suspension of enforcement activities by the competition authorities of 
the Requesting Party; 
14 (vi)  fully inform the competition authorities of the Requesting Party of the 
results  of their investigation,  and  take  into  account  the  views  of the 
competition authorities of  the Requesting Party, prior to any settlement, 
initiation of proceedings,  adoption of remedies,  or termination of the 
investigation; and 
(vii)  comply  with  any  reasonable  request  that  may  be  made  .  by  the 
competition authorities ofthe Requesting Party. 
When  the  above  conditions  ~e satisfied,  a Requesting Party which  chooses not  to 
defer or suspend its enforcement activities shall inform the competition authorities of 
the Requested Party of  its reasons. 
3.  The competition authorities of the Requesting Party may  defer or suspend their own 
enforcement  activities  if fewer  than  a.ll  of the  conditions  set  out  in  paragraph  2 
are satisfied. 
4.  Nothing in this Agreement precludes the competition authorities of a Requesting Party 
that  choose  to  defer  or  suspend  independent  enforcement  activities  from  later 
initiating ·or  reinstituting  such  activities.  In  such  circumstances,  the  competition 
· authorities of  the Requesting Party will promptly inform the competition authorities of 
the Requested Party of their intentions and  reasons.  If the competition authorities of 
the Requested Party continue with their own investigation, the competition authorities 
of the two Parties shall,  where appropriate, coordinate their respective investigations 
under the criteria and procedures of  Article IV of  the 1991  Agreement.  · 
Article V 
Confidentiality and Use of  Information 
Where  pursuant  to  this  Agreement  the  competition  authorities  of one  Party  provide 
information to the competition authorities of  the other Party for the purpose of implementing 
this Agreement, that information shall  be used by  the latter competition authorities only for 
that purpose. However, the competition authorities that provided the information may consent 
to another use, on condition that where confidential information has been provided pursuant to 
Article IV.2 (c) (iii)  on  the basis  of the consent of the source concerned,  that  source also 
agrees to the other use.  Disclosure of such information shall  be governed by the provisions 
of  Article  VIII  of the  1991  Agreement  and  the  exchange  of interpretative  letters  dated 
May 31  and July 31,  1995~ 
Article VI 
Relationship to the 1991 Agreement 
This Agreement shall supplement and be interpreted consistently with the 1991  Agreement, which 
remains fully in force. 
15 Article Vll 
Existing Law 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted in a manner, inconsistent with the existing laws,· or as 
requiring any change in the laws, of  the United States of  America or the European Communities or 
· of  their respective states or Member States. 
Article vm 
Entry Into Force and Termination 
1.  This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature. 
2.  This Agreement  shall  remain in force  until  60 days  after the date on  which either Party 
notifies the other Party in writing that it wishes to terminate the Agreement. 
IN WTINESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being du1y authorized, have signed this Agreement. 
DONE at  , in duplicate, this  day of  , 1997, in the Spanish, Danish, German, 
Greek, English, French, Italian, Dutch, Portuguese, Finnish and Swedish languages, each one being 
equally authentic. 
For the European Community and for the European Coal and Steel Community 
For the Government of  the United States of  America 
16 Statement by the Commission 
(on confidentiality of  information) 
o  The Statement made by the Commission in April 1995 on the confidentiality of  information 
and the exchange of  interpretative letters dated May 31  and July 31, 1995 in relation to the 
1991  Agreement apply in their entirety to this Agreement. 
o  Article  VII  of this  Agreement  states that  existing  Jaws  remain  unchanged  and  that  the 
Agreement  must  be  interpreted  consistently  with  those  existing  laws.  This  Agreement 
therefore cannot permit either of  the Parties' competition authorities to do any act they do 
not already have the power to do.  One consequence of this is that the Commission may 
only provide information to the US authorities where it is  consistent with Community law 
to do so. 
While this Agreement envisages that it may be appropriate to provide information to the 
other party in order to keep it informed of enforcement activities, confidential information 
may  only be provided with the consent of the source of that information. Community law 
provides a high level of  protection to confidential information provided to the Commission, 
and it will be necessary that any consent obtained is sufficient to discharge the Commission 
from its obligation of confidentiality pursuant to general principles of  Community law,  the 
case-law  of the  Court  of Justice  of the  European  Communities  and  Article  20(2)  of 
Council Regulation No 17. 
Statement by the Commission 
(on transparency) 
•  The principles on transparency which govern the relationship between the Commission and 
the Member States in the application of  the competition rules as enshrined, for example, in 
Council  Regulation  No  17,  and  the  arrangements  contained  in  the  exchange  of 
interpretative letters dated May 31  and July 31,  1995  in  relation to the  1991  Agreement 
shall apply. 
•  The Member States shall  be informed of all  proceedings opened by the Commission as  a 
result of  a request by the US authorities under Article III of  this Agreement. 
•  Member  States  shall  be  informed  when  the  Commission  makes  a  request  to  the 
US authorities under Article III of  this Agreement to investigate anticompetitive activities. 
®  When the Commission opens proceedings following a request by the US  authorities under 
Article III of  this Agreement, the undertakings concerned shall be informed of  the existence 
of the  request,  at  the  latest  when  the  statement  of objections  is  issued,  or  when  a 
publication pursuant to Article 19(3) of  Council Regulation No 17 is made. 
eJ  The  annual  report  presented  by  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  on  the  application  of the  1991  Agreement  shall  also  cover the  application  of 
this Agreement. 
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